Product demography of de novo and de alio firms in the optical disk drive industry, 1983-1999. by Carroll,  G.R. & Khessina,  O.M.
Durham Research Online
Deposited in DRO:
22 September 2014
Version of attached ﬁle:
Published Version
Peer-review status of attached ﬁle:
Peer-reviewed
Citation for published item:
Carroll, G.R. and Khessina, O.M. (2008) 'Product demography of de novo and de alio ﬁrms in the optical disk
drive industry, 1983-1999.', Organization science., 19 (1). pp. 25-38.
Further information on publisher's website:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/orsc.1070.0301
Publisher's copyright statement:
c© 2008 INFORMS
Additional information:
A journal of the Institute of Management Sciences.
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for
personal research or study, educational, or not-for-proﬁt purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in DRO
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full DRO policy for further details.
Durham University Library, Stockton Road, Durham DH1 3LY, United Kingdom
Tel : +44 (0)191 334 3042 | Fax : +44 (0)191 334 2971
http://dro.dur.ac.uk
OrganizationScience
Vol. 19, No. 1, January–February 2008, pp. 25–38
issn 1047-7039 eissn 1526-5455 08 1901 0025
informs ®
doi 10.1287/orsc.1070.0301
©2008 INFORMS
Product Demography of De Novo and De Alio
Firms in the Optical Disk Drive Industry, 1983–1999
Olga M. Khessina
Johnson Graduate School of Management, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York 14853,
omk4@cornell.edu
Glenn R. Carroll
Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, Stanford, California 94305,
carroll_glenn@gsb.stanford.edu
Little theory and research addresses the ways organizational context affects the demography of products. We examinethis question here by focusing on an organization’s mode of market entry. Speciﬁcally, we explore differences between
ﬁrms entering a market de novo (start-up) and those entering de alio (diversiﬁcation from another market). We analyze
all products ever shipped in the worldwide optical disk drive (ODD) industry, 1983–1999. We ﬁnd an almost paradoxical
empirical pattern, whereby de novo ﬁrms typically introduce products with widely agreed upon “better” (that is, universally
more appealing) technological characteristics. Yet these products generally stay on the market for a shorter time than those
of de alio ﬁrms, whose products generally display less appealing technological features.
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Introduction
De novo ﬁrms (entrepreneurial start-ups) differ from
de alio ﬁrms (entrants from another industry) in their
entry conditions (Bruderl and Schussler 1990, Klepper
and Simons 2000), their innovation behavior (Khessina
2003), and their market fates (Carroll et al. 1996,
Mitchell 1994). Yet, the precise mechanisms by which
entry mode translates into innovation and other org-
anization-level outcomes remain unclear. Instead, ana-
lysts often assume that de novo and de alio ﬁrms vary in
their initial resource endowments and experiences, and
relate these conditions to organizational outcomes such
as failure (see Carroll and Khessina 2005).
In this paper, we explore a ﬁrm’s product demography
as one possible set of mechanisms through which entry
mode may affect organizational outcomes. Among other
things, product demography examines the life histories
of products to identify technological variation in product
offerings and the rates of product exit from markets.
While several prior empirical studies examine prod-
uct demography, the focus has been mainly on strategic
and economic considerations rather than organizational
context. Speciﬁcally, this research shows a higher rate
of product exit from the market (1) when the product
ages and becomes obsolete (Stavins 1995, Greenstein
and Wade 1998, Cottrell and Nault 2004, de Figueiredo
and Kyle 2006); (2) when the product design rests on
older technology (Bayus 1998); (3) when the prod-
uct is designed narrowly for one or few applications
(Cottrell and Nault 2004); and (4) when the product
faces intense competition from either other products
in the ﬁrm portfolio or products of other ﬁrms in the
industry (Greenstein and Wade 1998, de Figueiredo and
Kyle 2006). Conversely, a product stays on the market
longer when offered by a pioneering and innovative ﬁrm
(Stavins 1995), by a ﬁrm that recently entered the market
(Bayus 1998), or by a ﬁrm with a strong brand and large
market share (de Figueiredo and Kyle 2006). Moreover,
the speed of the product life cycle apparently does not
accelerate with maturation of technology (Bayus 1998,
Greenstein and Wade 1998).
These studies show that product longevity is poten-
tially affected by three general types of factors: product
characteristics, industry conditions, and ﬁrm strategy.
However, we know very little about whether product
demography varies across organizational contexts, de-
spite the obvious fact that product launch and withdrawal
decisions are made within formal organizational struc-
tures that can differ dramatically and have been shown
to affect many major decisions within ﬁrms. The core
intuition we develop here sees an organization’s entry
mode as central to product longevity.
Exactly how entry mode might affect product demog-
raphy is far from obvious. Consider, for instance, the
longevity of a product on the market. A common intu-
ition suggests that technically superior products should
remain viable longer than technically inferior products.
Yet, as we document below for optical disk drives
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(ODDs), although de novo ﬁrms typically introduce
technically superior products (Khessina 2003), their
products do not necessarily stay on the market longer.
Why? In our view, the answer contains three parts.
First, de novo ﬁrms usually project a stronger market-
speciﬁc identity, leading to a narrower screening of prod-
uct offerings on the basis of technological performance.
Second, de alio ﬁrms typically have superior resources
and capabilities at time of entry. Third, de alio ﬁrms
evaluate their products’ performance more broadly in
the context of the other activities of the ﬁrm (e.g., mar-
ket presence, reputation, cross-subsidy of other lines of
business, etc.).
To explain better, we develop theoretical ideas about
product longevity by entry mode by drawing on theo-
ries about organizational identity, resources, and capabil-
ities. Using hazard function models, we then analyze the
effects of organizational entry mode on product longevi-
ties in the worldwide ODD market from 1983–1999.
The ﬁndings show that entry mode does shape a ﬁrm’s
product demography, above and beyond the effects of
product characteristics, industry conditions, and ﬁrm
strategy. Moreover, we show that entry mode is more
tightly linked to product exit when it is associated with
ﬁrm exit, thereby strengthening the suggestion that prod-
uct demography operates as a mechanism behind entry
mode processes.
Optical Disk Drive Industry
Our empirical context is the ODD industry. Following
periods dominated by ﬂoppy drives and hard disk drives,
ODDs now come as standard equipment on many per-
sonal computers.1 However, knowledge about the tech-
nology and industry appears limited. So, we brieﬂy
review the technology and its industrial context, focus-
ing on aspects that come into play in our analysis.
Technology. Production of an ODD deﬁnes member-
ship in the organizational population we investigate. The
ODD is one of several main devices (including hard disk
drives, ﬂoppy disk drives, tape drives, hard disk arrays,
USB ﬂash drives) used for the storage and retrieval of
electronic information. By design, the optical method for
data storage relies on the help of a laser for the record-
ing and retrieval of information. Accordingly, the scien-
tiﬁc foundations of optical drives reside in optics and
physics, as opposed to the surface science underlying
hard disk drives (Esener 1999).
ODD systems consist of two main components: (1) a
disk for storage and (2) a drive for recording, retrieval,
and output. Drive-based optical recording and informa-
tion retrieval proceed as follows. Information is stored
on a polycarbonate disk in the form of holes called pits.
During recording, pits are generated by a laser beam.
The stored digital information can later be retrieved by
a drive. The drive’s optical pickup creates a laser beam
directed at the spinning disk. Logic timing circuits reg-
ister the difference between the distance the light travels
when it strikes pits and the distance the light travels
when it strikes disk areas with no pits. The reﬂected
signals correspond to the binary coding of 1s and 0s.
These signals are then directed to a processor that reads
the reﬂection and converts it into a stream of digital
pulses, which, in turn, are converted into text, pictures,
or sounds (Purcell 2000).
Capsule History of Optical Data Storage Technology.
In 1972, Philips announced a method of optical stor-
age of audio content based on analog modulation tech-
niques. Analog modulation was soon abandoned in
favor of digital signal encoding methods. During the
same period, Sony undertook research to perfect error-
correction methods that could be applied to digitally
encoded audio. Collaboration between Sony and Philips
resulted in the merging of Philips’s signal format with
Sony’s error-correction method. In June of 1980, the
two companies introduced the compact disc digital audio
system.
To develop techniques for storing data on disk,
Philips, Sony, NEC, and other companies attempted par-
allels to the optical method for audio storage. These
efforts resulted in the ﬁrst ODD format designed for data
storage that was shipped to the market in 1983. Compact
disk read only memory (CD-ROM) format, tagged Yel-
low Book, was introduced soon after in 1985. Initially,
the costs and dismal performance of CD-ROM discour-
aged many potential users, although further development
drove costs down and improved performance. In 1986,
a number of industry representatives agreed on a com-
mon ﬁle system structure that became known as the
High Sierra format. This format grew popular, and was
adopted as the ISO 9660 standard in 1988. ISO certiﬁ-
cation stimulated the development of CD-ROM technol-
ogy because it facilitated compatibility among different
producers (Disk/Trend, Inc. 1985–1999, Purcell 2000).
The next-generation device, introduced in 1984, pro-
vided a ﬂexible write-once, read-many capability. End-
users could then record and playback computer data
from the same drive. The third generation optical drives,
today’s rewritable systems, were introduced in 1988.
They offer record, playback, and erase capabilities
(Disk/Trend, Inc. 1985–1988).
In early 1995, two different digital videodisk formats
emerged. Toshiba led a camp of companies using the
Super Density format. Sony and Philips devised their
own approach—the MultiMedia compact disc. At the
end of year, the charter for the DVD consortium was
drawn up and dissension over format diminished as the
standard for the DVD was formalized. The ﬁrst DVD
players were shipped in 1996 (Disk/Trend, Inc. 1996,
Purcell 2000).
Over the years, manufacturers promoted other types of
optical storage products that did not succeed, but often
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Figure 1 Annual Number of Firms Operating by Entry Mode
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
19
83
19
84
19
85
19
86
19
87
19
88
19
89
19
90
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
Year
N
um
be
r o
f f
irm
s
De alio
De novo
instigated format wars. Wide compatibility among dif-
ferent producers was achieved in 2000, when 17 CD
and DVD drive manufacturers, representing more than
90% of all optical drive shipments worldwide, complied
with the MultiRead speciﬁcation developed and pro-
moted by the Optical Storage Technology Association
(Taylor et al. 2006).
Corporate Demographics. Firms with both types of
entry modes have long populated the optical storage
industry. As Figure 1 shows, the characteristic distribu-
tion historically consists of a preponderance of de alio
entrants coupled with a small number of de novo start-
ups (data sources are discussed below). For the period
we study, 86 ﬁrms entered the market de alio and 49
exited, while 23 de novos entered and 17 exited. Of the
86 de alio ﬁrms, 83 came into the ODD industry from
related industries: computers and computer peripherals,
consumer electronics, electronic and electrical compo-
nents, and optics.
Background on Organizational Entry Mode
A signiﬁcant body of research in organization theory,
perhaps best called corporate demography, focuses on
the de novo and de alio distinction among ﬁrms and
seeks to understand how the entry mode of a ﬁrm affects
its organization-level outcomes (see Carroll and Hannan
2000).2 A basic insight holds that de alio companies
enjoy signiﬁcant advantages in performance and survival
because at the time of entry they have more resources
and greater experience than de novo ﬁrms. This expecta-
tion agrees with the pattern of ﬁndings of empirical stud-
ies conducted on multiple industries and organizational
populations in different countries and time periods. For
example, de alio ﬁrms display signiﬁcantly lower mor-
tality rates than de novo ﬁrms in the population of
American labor unions (Hannan and Freeman 1988), in
the U.S. semiconductor industry (Freeman 1990, Barnett
and Freeman 2001), in the population of new ﬁrms in
West Germany (Bruderl et al. 1992), in the U.S. auto-
mobile industry (Rao 1994, Carroll et al. 1996); in the
population of Manhattan facsimile transmission service
organizations (Baum et al. 1995), in the British, French,
and German automobile industries (Hannan et al. 1998,
Dobrev et al. 2001), in the U.S. television receiver indus-
try (Klepper and Simons 2000), and in the U.S. com-
puter manufacturing industry (Swanson 2002, Barnett
et al. 2003). De alio ﬁrms also experience higher market
shares in the U.S. television receiver industry (Klepper
and Simons 2000).
In developing this basic insight about entry mode,
Carroll et al. (1996) argued that de novo ﬁrms are more
ﬂexible, and that this ﬂexibility might shift the advantage
to de novo ﬁrms over time if the environment changes
fast enough. Subsequent empirical studies show support
for this claim: Initially higher mortality rates of de novo
ﬁrms converge to those of de alio ﬁrms with organiza-
tional age in the U.S. automobile industry (Carroll et al.
1996), in the British, French, and German automobile
industries (Hannan et al. 1998), and in the U.S. medi-
cal equipment industry (Mitchell 1994). De novo ﬁrms
also show a propensity to innovate at a higher rate than
de alio ﬁrms in the worldwide ODD industry, even years
after entry (Khessina 2003).
Despite ample empirical research, little is known
about mechanisms by which entry mode produces differ-
ences in organization-level outcomes between de novo
and de alio ﬁrms. We believe that product demography
can be one possible set of such mechanisms.
Theory
Our analysis of product demography focuses primarily
on the rate of a product’s exit from the market, viewed
conversely as a product’s longevity in the marketplace.
We ﬁnd it useful to think of product longevity as result-
ing from two different kinds of general forces (1) mar-
ket forces that determine the viability of the product
as an attractive choice relative to other options avail-
able to buyers and (2) internal organizational forces that
encourage a ﬁrm’s decision makers to leave the product
on the market even after its market viability has dimin-
ished below the normal threshold. Theoretical arguments
about both types of forces must be considered to make
predictions about a product’s longevity or rate of exit.
We propose generally that products made by de alio and
de novo ﬁrms differ in their rates of exit because mech-
anisms driven by resources, capabilities, and identities
affect both market and internal organizational forces.
Resources. Resource differences are commonly in-
voked to explain a well-established pattern of higher
mortality by de novo ﬁrms: At time of entry de novo
ﬁrms typically have fewer resources than de alio ﬁrms.
Abundant resources provide an entrant a longer period of
immunity from market forces, and allow the ﬁrm more
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time to establish its suppliers, production system, and
customer base.
Capabilities. De novo ﬁrms also display less devel-
oped capabilities than de alio ﬁrms at time of entry.
Firms with highly developed capabilities provide ac-
countable and reliable performance (Hannan and
Freeman 1984) and acquire positional advantages, such
as status, market power, and political inﬂuence (Podolny
1993, Barnett 1997). However, even advantageous capa-
bilities can become constraints in certain contexts
(Leonard-Barton 1992). The net beneﬁts conveyed by
capabilities depend not only on the level of their devel-
opment, but also on a ﬁrm’s ability to alter them to
reﬂect the demands of the changing environment, i.e.,
on structural ﬂexibility. Oddly enough, the lack of well-
developed capabilities implies that de novo ﬁrms are
more structurally ﬂexible (Carroll et al. 1996, Khessina
2003).
Identities. A less obvious but potentially important
difference between de novo and de alio ﬁrms concerns
the identities they project and the associated behav-
iors of those involved with the ﬁrms, both internally
and externally. In the view of McKendrick and col-
leagues (McKendrick and Carroll 2001, McKendrick
et al. 2003), de alio entrants typically derive their pri-
mary identities from activities outside the focal market.
De novo ﬁrms therefore project identities more clearly
focused on the new market and its participants and gate-
keepers. This difference matters because perceptually
focused identities are thought to be important for a vari-
ety of mutually reinforcing reasons:
First, focused identities mean that both insiders and out-
siders will be more likely to recognize and identify some-
thing distinctive. So, focus increases salience. Second,
the greater homogeneity of organizations with focused
identities implies that form boundaries and exclusion
rules are simpler. Simpler boundary rules make polic-
ing or sanctioning possible (Zuckerman 1999). Third,
salience and homogeneity provide the seedbed for gen-
erating solidarity and organizing for self-promotion and
defense (Buechler 2000). (McKendrick et al. 2003, p. 66)
McKendrick et al. (2003) show in the disk array indus-
try that the density of de novo ﬁrms contributes more
strongly to legitimation of the organizational form than
does de alio density or total density.
While enhanced legitimacy beneﬁts all ﬁrms in a pop-
ulation, a focused identity imposes serious constraints
on the actions of ﬁrms with that identity. Audiences with
control over material and symbolic resources necessary
for ﬁrm operation, such as investors, employees, and
consumers, expect de novo ﬁrms to behave in certain,
well-deﬁned ways consistent with the identity. For exam-
ple, a study by Barthelemy (2006) of the outsourcing of
“noses” in the perfume industry reveals that de novo per-
fume houses are more likely to rely on in-house noses
to develop fragrances than are de alio ﬁrms. He explains
that this is because de novo ﬁrms are primarily associ-
ated with the perfume industry and seek the authenticity
provided by internal sourcing, even when institutional
trends move in the other direction. This authenticity
proves important to the founders, ﬁnanciers, distributors,
and customers.
Précis. Considering how these differences in re-
sources, capabilities, and identities operate on a prod-
uct’s market viability and a ﬁrm’s internal propensity
to maintain a low viability product leads us to several
plausible predictions.
First, in markets such as optical drives where competi-
tion has a clear technological character, the identities of
de novo ﬁrms push them to stay at the frontier of tech-
nology and to maintain a product portfolio that reﬂects
this identity. At time of entry, de alio ﬁrms transfer
many resources and capabilities from their parent com-
panies, giving them an identity based partly (and perhaps
mainly) on the parent company. As a result, de alio ﬁrms
experience less pressure to demonstrate their ability and
promise in the focal industry. By contrast, the identities
of de novo ﬁrms, being tightly linked to the focal indus-
try, prompt them to offer products at the technological
frontier to meet expectations of resource-holding audi-
ences, irrespective of whether the technological position
improves actual market viability. The pressure for faster
product turnaround to keep up with the shifting techno-
logical frontier should result in shorter product lifetimes
of de novo ﬁrms.
Second, the well-developed capabilities of de alio
ﬁrms allow them to make products that enjoy greater
market success (and do so for a longer time) than those
of de novo ﬁrms. Speciﬁcally, the stable employment
systems and manufacturing routines of de alio ﬁrms help
them to generate products of consistent quality and relia-
bility (Hannan and Freeman 1984). Market-based experi-
ence acquired in related industries helps de alio ﬁrms to
effectively advertise their products (Nerkar and Roberts
2004). Parent company reputations (Kerin et al. 1996),
status (Podolny 1994), and established identities as pro-
ducers of related types of products (Swanson 2002) help
de alio ﬁrms’ products attract the attention of customers
in a focal industry. By contrast, de novo ﬁrms lack well-
developed manufacturing routines, market-based experi-
ence, and other complementary assets. As a result, they
often create products of inconsistent quality and have
difﬁculty distributing and promoting those products.
Third, de alio ﬁrms are more likely to have rea-
sons and resources to keep less viable (underperforming)
products on the market for a longer time, both inten-
tionally and unintentionally. The overall identity of the
de novo ﬁrm rests more squarely on the focal indus-
try than does that of the de alio ﬁrm. Thus the repu-
tational damage to the ﬁrm of offering technologically
Khessina and Carroll: Product Demography of De Novo and De Alio Firms
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inferior products is greater for de novo ﬁrms. Further,
de alio ﬁrms have more slack resources than de novo
organizations (Stavins 1995). Slack allows these ﬁrms
the luxury of keeping unviable products on the market
with an intention to detect shifts in customer preferences,
to erect entry barriers, or to exploit mutual forbear-
ance (Haveman and Nonnemaker 2000, Sorenson 2000).
Additionally, de alio ﬁrms may intentionally keep less
viable products for subsidiaries or other parts of the ﬁrm
that still use those products. Finally, the greater iner-
tia of de alio ﬁrms may prompt them to unintentionally
keep unviable products on the market. As more struc-
turally complex and bureaucratic organizations, de alio
ﬁrms are more likely to be concerned with sunk costs
and may become subject to the bureaucratic rationaliza-
tion of waiting for an unviable product to show a proﬁt
(Staw 1981).
To summarize, differences between de novo and
de alio ﬁrms in resources, capabilities, and identity pres-
sures lead us to think that
Hypothesis 1. Products offered by de novo ﬁrms exit
the market at a higher rate than products made by
de alio ﬁrms.
We extend the argument by considering what happens
as de novo ﬁrms age in the focal industry. We suspect
that they experience less pressure to demonstrate their
technological prowess at every moment and with every
external interaction. Aging de novo ﬁrms also develop
capabilities that may allow them to make products that
become more attractive to customers (Carroll et al. 1996,
Sørensen and Stuart 2000). Aging de novo organizations
may also accumulate slack resources that would allow
them to keep even unproﬁtable products on the market.
Therefore we expect that
Hypothesis 2. The exit rate of products offered by
de novo ﬁrms decreases as these ﬁrms age.
Methodology
Data Sources for ODD Firms and Products
To test the hypotheses, we constructed a data set of all
ODD products shipped in the worldwide market from
the beginning of the industry in 1983 through 1999, the
last year of full coverage from the most comprehensive
source available to us. The original primary data sources
are annual reports on different data storage devices,
including ODDs, published by Disk/Trend, Inc. (1985–
1999). The reports publish technical speciﬁcations on
each product shipped by each producer of ODDs. There
is also ﬁrm-level data on revenues and unit shipment for
the largest ﬁrms in the industry.
We deﬁne products by industry convention. That is,
we identify unique products using each company’s def-
initions of products, based on the distinctions the com-
pany makes in its offerings to the buyer market. This
approach to deﬁning products essentially relies on the
socially constructed market identities of products. In the
optical drive context, products are deﬁned as a model
shipped by a ﬁrm to the market, which has a distinctive
label and differs from other products in a ﬁrm’s portfolio
by at least one technical characteristic. On occasion, the
Disk/Trend reports list announced products that never
made it to market. We excluded these listings from our
analysis.3
Starting Events of Production. We deﬁne a product’s
introduction by its ﬁrst shipment to the customer mar-
ket. The Disk/Trend reports provide information on the
ﬁrst customer shipment with varying degrees of preci-
sion. Disk/Trend gives some dates with precision to the
month, others with precision to the quarter, and still
others with precision to the year. We converted these
dates to decimal years; dates given to the month were
coded as occurring at the beginning of the month. Fol-
lowing Petersen’s (1991) recommendations for dealing
with time aggregation, dates given to only the quarter
were coded as occurring at the midpoint of the quarter.
Dates given to only the year were coded as occurring at
the midpoint of the year.
Ending Events of Production. We identiﬁed a prod-
uct’s exit from the market by the date its shipment to
retailers from the manufacturers ceases. The Disk/Trend
reports do not provide exact information on the last ship-
ment of the product. The annual report comes out in the
third quarter of each year. It covers revenues and unit
shipment for the previous calendar year, and ﬁrms and
products for the current year. Using this information, we
assumed that the last shipment of the product happens
in the third quarter of the year the product is last men-
tioned in a Disk/Trend report, and coded product exit as
happening at the midpoint of the third quarter of that
year.
From 1983 to 1999, 109 ﬁrms entered the worldwide
ODD industry, and 66 exited. These 109 ﬁrms shipped
1,323 products on the worldwide ODD market, of which
1,019 products exited the market. The data include 2,999
product-ﬁrm-year observations.
Operationalization of Variables
Dependent Variable. The dependent variable in the
models we estimated in this study is the product-speciﬁc
instantaneous rate of exit from the market (deﬁned for-
mally below). A product is considered to exit the market
in year t if it is not shipped in year t + 1. This deﬁni-
tion of product exit was used in prior studies of prod-
uct longevity (Bayus 1998, Greenstein and Wade 1998,
Cottrell and Nault 2004, de Figueiredo and Kyle 2006).
Independent Variable. We operationalized the entry
mode of a ﬁrm in two ways. First, we constructed a vari-
able labeled de novo ﬁrm dummy that takes a value of one
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if a product is made by a ﬁrm that entered the industry as
a start-up, and a value of zero if it is made by a ﬁrm that
diversiﬁed into the industry from another market. This
time-invariant variable is used to test Hypothesis 1.
The second variable weights de novo status by tenure
of the ﬁrm in the industry.4 This tenure-weighted
de novo variable is calculated as Dwjt = exp−Fjt/10 ∗
Dj , where Fjt denotes tenure in the ODD industry for
ﬁrm j at year t, and Dj denotes de novo entry mode
for ﬁrm j . It shows whether a product is made by a
diversiﬁer (takes a value of zero) or by a start-up (takes
inverted time-varying values depending on start-up age).
For products made by start-ups, this variable tells how
much time has elapsed since the ﬁrm was founded. The
more time elapsed since a founding event, the lower the
value of the tenure-weighted de novo variable (i.e., the
closer it is to zero). The distribution of this variable
across all product-year spells is skewed with the high-
est frequency of scores near unity. We use this variable
to test Hypothesis 2, predicting that the de novo/de alio
distinction in product longevity wears off over time.
Product Controls. Product age, measured as the num-
ber of years since a product was ﬁrst shipped, is used
to control for product exit because of its obsolescence
(Stavins 1995).
Products designated for captive (sold primarily for use
with systems offered by either the manufacturer or its
subsidiaries) and noncaptive use (sold to other ﬁrms and
end-users) may vary in market longevity. The greater
inertia of internal markets between parent companies
and their subsidiaries suggests longer life span of cap-
tive products. To control for this inﬂuence, we created a
time-invariant dummy variable captive product that takes
a value of one if a product is sold through captive chan-
nel and a value of zero otherwise.
Products compete with each other more intensely
within product groups than across them (Greenstein and
Wade 1998). Based on the Disk/Trend report classiﬁca-
tion of optical drives into product groups according to
a product’s operating mode and recording capacity, we
created two sets of variables. Operating mode dummies
(i.e., the rewritable, the write once, and the read-only
memory) take a value of one if a product is designed for
read only, write once, or rewritable operation, respec-
tively, and zero otherwise. The read-only memory is as
an omitted dummy in analyses.
Recording capacity of the optical disk is ﬁxed because
only a certain number of pits can be physically ﬁtted on
a disk. The number of pits that ﬁt on a disk depends
on the diameter of the disk and on recoding technology.
Recoding technology can be either CD or DVD based.
DVD family drive takes a value of one if a drive is DVD
based and a value of zero otherwise to control for DVD
drives’ capacity to generate pits of smaller size on a
disk, and therefore to record more information than CD
drives.
The number of pits that ﬁt on the disk also depends
on the disk diameter. During the history of industry
development, optical drives of different diameters were
introduced ranging from 64 mm to 356 mm. However,
market pressures for compatibility led to the acceptance
of High Sierra format in 1986 and the subsequent adop-
tion of the ISO 9660 standard in 1988 and ensured
that the 120 mm drive became dominant on the market
(Purcell 2000). The variable drive diameter 120 mm/80
mm is a dummy with a value of one if a drive is des-
ignated for 120 mm/80 mm disks and zero otherwise.
This dummy was created to account for differences in
recording capacity because of drive diameter.
Variable data access time is used to assess the tech-
nological advancement of products. Data access time is
the physical operation associated with positioning the
read/write head of a storage device in the proper loca-
tion to read or write a particular piece of data. The
seek operation generally requires varying the rotational
speed of the disk in relation to the radial position of
the laser read head. Technically, data access time is the
sum of the average positioning time and the rotational
latency (the inherent delay experienced by the laser read
head when locating speciﬁed data). Data access time is
an appropriate parameter to measure a product’s tech-
nological advancement. During the observation period,
it was one of the key indicators of ODD performance
(Disk/Trend, Inc. 1999, Esener 1999, Purcell 2000).5
Data access time is measured in milliseconds. To make
the effects of product data access time across different
years easily interpretable, we standardize its measure by
dividing a product’s data access time in each year by the
industry’s mean data access time in the year. In this way,
the frontier moves each year as technology progresses.
In general, the smaller (faster) a product’s (standardized)
data access time, the closer its performance to the tech-
nological frontier.
Organizational Controls. Large organizations may
have products with longer market lifetimes than the
products of small organizations for at least two reasons.
First, large ﬁrms have a higher probability of introducing
a successful product because they have the resources to
produce multiple models. Second, large ﬁrms have more
resources to keep unproﬁtable products on the market
longer. Because many de alio ﬁrms are large and many
de novo ﬁrms are small, we control for organizational
size to separate the effect of a ﬁrm’s entry mode from
the effect of its size.
We construct a measure of the ﬁrm’s size as scale
of operations, speciﬁcally, as a ﬁrm’s annual revenue
in millions of U.S. dollars from its sale of ODDs.
Disk/Trend provides precise ﬁrm-speciﬁc revenue data
only for the major producers in the market: the top 10 to
20 ODD manufacturers, such as Sony, Matsushita, and
Philips, which collectively represent approximately 90%
Khessina and Carroll: Product Demography of De Novo and De Alio Firms
Organization Science 19(1), pp. 25–38, © 2008 INFORMS 31
of all annual industry revenue. For nonmajor producers,
Disk/Trend does not publish ﬁrm-speciﬁc revenue ﬁg-
ures. However, it records the annual aggregate revenue
of nonmajor smaller producers based on their geographic
location, i.e., companies based in the United States and
those not in the United States. We imputed annual rev-
enue for each smaller producer in non-U.S. and U.S.
categories by dividing total revenue of nonmajor produc-
ers in a category by the number of nonmajor producers
in that category. We report the models with this variable
included but do not ﬁnd that it substantially affects any
of the major conclusions.
Across the history of the industry, Japanese multi-
national ﬁrms have shipped the greatest number of
products and kept the largest share of the market
(Disk/Trend, Inc. 1999). Some researchers believe that
Japan’s strength in optical storage is a result of its long-
term success in both research and manufacturing in opto-
electronics (Miyazaki 1995, Esener 1996). All Japanese
producers are de alio ﬁrms. So, the Japanese headquar-
ters dummy, which takes value of one if a ﬁrm has head-
quarters in Japan and zero if otherwise, is used to ensure
that the predicted market longevity of products made by
de alio ﬁrms is not just a reﬂection of the longevity of
products made by Japanese multinationals.
Two variables control for possible effects of a ﬁrm’s
product portfolio on its product longevity. Firm’s num-
ber of products, deﬁned as the number of distinct prod-
ucts that a ﬁrm ships to the market in a given year, is
expected to increase this ﬁrm’s product exit rate because
multiple products in a portfolio increase the likelihood
of product cannibalization (Greenstein and Wade 1998).
Firm’s cumulative number of products is the number of
distinct products that a ﬁrm shipped since its entry into
the industry until a given year; it measures ﬁrm produc-
tion experience (Stavins 1995). The variable is lagged
one year.
Publicly traded and privately held companies may dif-
fer in how long their products stay on the market. For
example, publicly traded companies under pressure from
shareholders may be inclined toward faster culling of
old product lines. The dummy public ﬁrm takes a value
of one in years when a company was listed as publicly
traded and zero otherwise.
Firm’s number of patents granted in ODD is the num-
ber of distinctive patents granted to a ﬁrm in ODD tech-
nology in a given year. Following Rosenkopf and Nerkar
(2001), we deﬁned patents as those in ODD technology
if they belong to patent subclasses that cover different
components of an ODD system.
Industry Controls. Several variables are used to con-
trol for industry processes. Three variables control for
effects of environmental muniﬁcence on product mar-
ket longevity. The variable worldwide industry revenues
measured in millions of U.S. dollars describes the real-
ized demand for the product. The variable PC unit
shipments measured in millions of units provides infor-
mation about the size of the key (largest) market for
ODDs. Number of patents granted in ODD technology,
which is a number of distinct patents granted in a given
year in the ODD technology, measures technological
muniﬁcence of the industry.
The number of products on the market creates com-
petition for a buyer’s attention (de Figueiredo and Kyle
2006). Time-varying counts of product density control
for intensity of product competition.
To account for possible effects of population aging,
including ﬁrst-mover or order-of-entry advantages on
product market longevity (Lieberman and Montgomery
1988), we constructed a ﬁxed product-level variable
product’s order of entry deﬁned as population age in the
year that a product was shipped to the market for the
ﬁrst time. Count of years starts in 1983, so that a prod-
uct that was introduced in 1983 is assigned the value of
zero, a product that was introduced in 1984 is assigned
a value of one and so on. The variable is time invariant.
The presence or absence of technological standards
may affect product longevity on the market. The
standard ISO 9660 period dummy takes a value of one
for years 1988–1999 and zero otherwise to control for
the inﬂuence of the only ofﬁcial standard during the
observation period. Effects of other formats are captured
by the variable industry age, which is the age of the
worldwide ODD industry. Industry age variable is also
meant to control for other unobserved and observed tem-
poral changes that may affect product chances to exit
the market.
Model Speciﬁcation
Product exit rates are assessed using continuous-time
event history analysis. We treat a product as the unit at
risk, and the dependent variable is the instantaneous rate
of a product’s exit from the worldwide ODD industry,
deﬁned as
r
t= lim
t→0
Pt < T < t+t  T > t
t

where T is a random variable for the time of the event
of interest, t is the time that a product has existed, and
P
· is the conditional probability of the product’s exit
from the market over the interval [t, t +t] given that
the product was still on the market at time t. We use
the continuous time framework because we believe it
more accurately reﬂects the actual process we study,
whereby ﬁrms might launch and withdraw products at
any moment in time.
We use a piecewise exponential function to represent
variation in the timing of product exit from the market to
allow a ﬂexible speciﬁcation of product age-dependence.
A piecewise exponential model represents a widely
used strategy that splits the time axis into time pieces
determined by an analyst (Carroll and Hannan 2000,
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pp. 136–138). After examining life tables and exploring
estimates of a variety of choices of the breakpoints, we
decided to break the duration scale in years at 1.0, 2.0,
3.0, 4.0, and 5.0.
The product exit rate r
u t is speciﬁed as a func-
tion of product age (u), product contemporaneous
density (Nt), entry mode of a ﬁrm that makes the prod-
uct (D), and other measured covariates (X). The general
class of models we estimate has the form
ln r
u t=mp+Nit +Di+Xit
where mp denotes product age-speciﬁc effects, Nit de-
notes product density for product i at year t, Di denotes
entry mode of a ﬁrm making product i, and Xit summa-
rizes time-varying covariates.
In testing the hypotheses, we estimated models using
the method of maximum likelihood as implemented
with a user-deﬁned routine in STATA (Sørensen 1999).
To estimate rate models with time-varying covariates,
we constructed split-spell data breaking observed dura-
tions in year-long periods with the values of covariates
updated every year.
Findings
The descriptive data on optical drives’ data access time
in Table 1 shows that de novo ﬁrms offer more tech-
nologically advanced products with better performance
parameters and smaller distance from the technological
frontier. First, de novo ﬁrms make products with, on aver-
age, faster data access time than de alio ﬁrms. Nominal
data access time of de novo and de alio ﬁrms’ products
is 193.7 ms and 244.9 ms, respectively, whereas their
standardized data access time is 0.778 and 1.02. Sec-
ond, the average distance of standardized data access
time of de novo ﬁrm’s products from the technolog-
ical frontier is smaller (0.699) than that of de alio
Table 1 Comparison of Products of De Novo and De Alio Firms
De Novo De Alio
Variables Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev.
Product age at last observation (includes both censored and
uncensored cases)
125 145 144 142
Firm size at time of product entry 994 900 2325 2902
Data access time of optical drive product [in ms] 1937 1185 2449 2679
Data access time standardized 0778 0454 102 0908
Distance of data access time of optical drive product from
the industry frontier at time of product entry
0699 0430 0848 0782
Distance of data access time of optical drive product from
the ﬁrm’s best optical drive at time of product entry
(excludes single-product ﬁrms)
0207 0300 0561 0817
Percentage of optical drive products that represent the ﬁrm’s
best optical drive at time of product entry
(excludes single-product ﬁrms)
475 259
Difference in data access time between a ﬁrm’s new optical
drive product and its previous best optical drive product [in ms]
263 1233 −641 1638
Firm’s number of products 377 174 1203 1044
(0.848). Third, de novo ﬁrms introduce products closer
to their current best product in terms of standardized
performance (0.207) than de alio ﬁrms (0.561). Finally,
de novo ﬁrms introduce products that, on average,
improve more over their previous best product in nom-
inal data access time (26.3 ms) than de alio ﬁrms
(−641 ms). Thus, de novo ﬁrms typically offer products
that locate closer to the frontier and to each other than
de alio ﬁrms.
These descriptive results are consistent with the ﬁnd-
ings of Khessina (2003) who demonstrated that in the
ODD industry, de novo ﬁrms display an advantage at
creating products with performance near the technolog-
ical frontier. Her empirical analysis controlled for sam-
ple selection because of ﬁrm mortality as well as ﬁrm
age, size, dominance, product portfolio, incumbency sta-
tus, and country location. Khessina (2003) showed that
although there is no apparent difference between de novo
and de alio ﬁrms in the overall rate of product introduc-
tion, de novo ﬁrms introduce more products with data
access time faster than the industry mean, and products
with data access time in the top 15%, 20%, and 25% of
industry performance distribution.
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics of the split-spell
ﬁle used for event history analysis. The ﬁle contains
multiple spells for each product, so it does not always
intuitively reﬂect the experiences of products on the mar-
ket. From 1983 to 1999, 1,201 de alio and 122 de novo
products were shipped on the ODD market, of which
916 de alio and 103 de novo products exited the market.
Table 3 presents the estimates of the piecewise-ex-
ponential rate models of the exit of products from
the worldwide ODD market from 1983 through 1999.
Model 3.1 in Table 3 shows support for Hypothesis 1:
De novo ﬁrms’ products have a signiﬁcantly higher
probability of exiting the market than de alio ﬁrms’
products.
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Table 2 Descriptive Statistics for ODD Products: Split-Spell File
Variables Mean Std. dev. Min. Max.
Product exit= 1 0340 0474 0 1
Product age at the ﬁrst spell (u) 08091 128 0 938
Product age at the last spell (u) 144 142 0042 10
Density all products (t) 26724 9778 3 377
Product’s order of entry u0 1034 394 0 16
Industry revenues [in millions of U.S. dollars] (t) 4,640 2,949 2 8,764
Industry age [in years] (t) 1143 353 0 16
PC unit shipments [in millions] (t) 6038 3129 8 113
Period dummy for standard ISO 9660 (1988–1999)= 1 0956 0206 0 1
Number of patents granted in ODD technology (t) 2684 6595 57 346
Firm’s size [revenues in millions of U.S.$] (t) 21827 28286 03 1,079.9
Ln ﬁrm’s size (t) 403 202 −120 698
Firm’s number of products (t) 1133 1026 1 44
Firm’s cumulative number of products (t− 1) 5031 5916 1 279
Japanese headquarters dummy= 1 0644 0479 0 1
Public ﬁrm= 1 (t) 0753 0431 0 1
Firm’s number of ODD patents granted (t) 874 1185 0 55
Captive product= 1 0176 0380 0 1
Drive operating mode: Write once= 1 0220 0415 0 1
Drive operating mode: Rewritable= 1 0266 0442 0 1
Drive operating mode: Read only= 1 (omitted) 0539 0499 0 1
DVD family drive= 1 0041 0198 0 1
Drive data access time [in ms] 2504 2800 2525 2,510
Drive data access time standardized 1 0882 0078 829
De novo data access time standardized 0778 0454 0128 232
De alio data access time standardized 102 0908 0078 829
Drive diameter 120 mm/80 mm= 1 0632 0482 0 1
De novo entry mode dummy= 1 0084 0278 0 1
Tenure-weighted de novo variable (t) 0069 0234 0 1
Notes. N of products= 1,323 (de alio= 1,201; de novo= 122); N of product exits= 1,019 (de alio= 916; de novo=
103); N of product-years= 2,999 (de alio= 2,746; de novo= 253).
1Numbers are based on both uncensored and right-censored cases.
Model 3.2 is similar to Model 3.1, but instead of
de novo dummy, it uses the tenure-weighted de novo
variable, which has a signiﬁcant positive effect on prod-
uct exit rates. This ﬁnding shows ﬁrst, that products
made by de novo ﬁrms have higher exit rates than those
made by de alio ﬁrms. Second, it shows that the more
recently a de novo ﬁrm was founded, the higher the exit
rates of its products. In other words, as a de novo ﬁrm
ages in the industry, the market longevity of its products
becomes similar to that of de alio ﬁrms. Thus, Hypoth-
esis 2, predicting that the effect of entry mode on exit
rates of products wears off with time, is supported.6
Next, we explore the connection between product exit
and ﬁrm exit, seeking to understand how product demo-
graphy might operate as a mechanism associated with
de novo effects. During the period of observation, 66 out
of 109 ﬁrms exited.7 Only 13.5% of all product exits
(138 out of 1,019 withdrawn products) were associated
with these ﬁrm exits. What is the relationship between
the two types of exit, if any? In our data, any time
a ﬁrm exits, its products also exit. Because ﬁrm exit
exactly predicts product exit, ﬁrm exit cannot be used
as a right-hand side variable (see similar discussion in
de Figueiredo and Kyle 2006, p. 260). But we can dis-
aggregate the product exit event into two separate events
(1) product exit simultaneous with ﬁrm exit and (2)
product exit with no ﬁrm exit. Although this disaggrega-
tion appears similar to that of a competing risks setup, it
differs fundamentally in that the two deﬁned events are
hierarchically related (product exit occurs in both events)
rather than representing two separate paths to the same
outcome. So analysis of the separate events is sugges-
tive at best. Moreover, it makes sense to only consider
ﬁrms with more than one product because product exit
predicts ﬁrm exit perfectly for single-product ﬁrms.
Previous research on ﬁrm exit rates using this data
shows that there is no signiﬁcant effect of de novo status
on ﬁrm disbanding (Khessina 2006). But the disaggre-
gated product exit rates equations suggest a link through
product demography. The de novo variable shows posi-
tive signiﬁcant relationships with the joint product and
ﬁrm exit event (see Model 3.3), but not with the prod-
uct exit only event (see Model 3.4). This suggests a
stronger association between product exit and ﬁrm exit
for de novo ﬁrms than for de alio. Although in case of
disbanding ﬁrms, it is impossible to determine whether
products exit from the market because a ﬁrm exits the
industry or whether the ﬁrm exits the industry because
its products were a market failure, the descriptive data
reveals some interesting associations. So, when de novo
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Table 3 Piecewise Exponential Models of Effects of Firms’ Entry Mode on Exit Rates of Optical Drive Products
Model (3.1) Model (3.2) Model (3.3) Model (3.4)
Event: All Event: All Event: Product Event: Product exit
product exit product exit exit and ﬁrm exit and no ﬁrm exit
Product age: 0<u≤ 1 −234∗∗∗ (0.469) −234∗∗∗ (0.466) −123∗∗∗ (1.93) −287∗∗∗ (0.575)
Product age: 1<u≤ 2 −0446 (0.475) −0444 (0.472) −960∗∗∗ (1.94) −106 (0.581)
Product age: 2<u≤ 3 0795 (0.513) 0799 (0.511) −787∗∗∗ (2.17) 0171 (0.614)
Product age: 3<u≤ 4 199∗∗ (0.573) 200∗∗∗ (0.572) −693∗∗ (2.32) 127 (0.669)
Product age: 4<u≤ 5 299∗∗∗ (0.666) 300∗∗∗ (0.665) −443 (2.84) 219∗∗ (0.762)
Product age: u> 5 438∗∗∗ (0.689) 439∗∗∗ (0.688) −166 (2.88) 328∗∗∗ (0.794)
Density all products (t) 0021∗∗∗ (0.002) 0021∗∗∗ (0.002) 0033∗∗∗ (0.008) 0019∗∗∗ (0.002)
Product’s order of entry (u0) 0980∗∗∗ (0.085) 0981∗∗∗ (0.085) 149∗∗∗ (0.339) 0929∗∗∗ (0.093)
Worldwide industry revenues 00002∗ (0.000) 00002∗ (0.000) 0001∗∗ (0.000) 0000 (0.000)
[in millions of U.S.$] (t)
Industry age/year (t) −107∗∗∗ (0.180) −107∗∗∗ (0.180) −307∗∗∗ (0.760) −0889∗∗∗ (0.203)
PC unit shipments [in million units] (t) −0068∗∗∗ (0.016) −0068∗∗∗ (0.016) −0036 (0.067) −0072∗∗∗ (0.018)
Standard ISO 9660 period dummy= 1 −125∗∗ (0.477) −124∗∗ (0.477) 152∗∗∗ (1.37) −146∗∗ (0.542)
Number of patents granted 0002 (0.001) 0002 (0.001) 0020∗∗∗ (0.005) 0001 (0.001)
in ODD technology (t)
Ln ﬁrm’s size [in millions of U.S.$] (t) −0045 (0.033) −0046 (0.033) −0666∗∗∗ (0.111) 0020 (0.036)
Firm’s number of products (t) 0006 (0.007) 0006 (0.007) −0455∗∗∗ (0.058) 0009 (0.007)
Firm’s cumulative number of products (t− 1) −00002 (0.002) 00002 (0.002) 0013 (0.007) 0000 (0.002)
Japanese headquarters dummy= 1 −0276∗∗ (0.097) −0277∗∗ (0.097) −0521 (0.480) −0226∗ (0.108)
Public ﬁrm= 1 (t) 0303∗∗ (0.111) 0308∗∗ (0.111) 0272 (0.342) 0330∗ (0.133)
Firm’s number of ODD −0013∗ (0.006) −0013∗ (0.006) 0096∗∗∗ (0.023) −0020∗∗ (0.006)
patents granted (t)
Captive product= 1 0027 (0.111) 0022 (0.112) −0233 (0.709) −0040 (0.118)
Operating mode: Write once= 1 −0541∗∗∗ (0.134) −0542∗∗∗ (0.134) −264∗∗ (0.960) −0419∗∗ (0.142)
Operating mode: Rewritable= 1 −0358∗ (0.160) −0351∗ (0.160) −268 (1.52) −0293 (0.165)
DVD family drive= 1 0035 (0.230) 0036 (0.230) −124∗∗∗ (0.609) 0037 (0.235)
Product’s access time (t) 0296∗ (0.147) 0293∗ (0.147) −0897 (1.45) 0356∗ (0.146)
[standardized]
Drive diameter 120 mm/80 mm= 1 107∗∗∗ (0.214) 106∗∗∗ (0.214) −0963 (1.68) 111∗∗∗ (0.231)
Drive diameter 120 mm/80 mm −0438∗∗ (0.155) −0434∗∗ (0.155) 0764 (1.49) −0486∗∗ (0.159)
∗ Product’s access time
De novo ﬁrm dummy= 1 0294∗ (0.140)
Tenure-weighted de novo variable (t) 0384∗ (0.164) 0940∗∗ (0.355) 0037 (0.216)
Number of products 1,126 1,126 1,103 1,103
Number of product exits 889 889 94 767
Number of product-year observations 2,545 2,545 2,448 2,448
Log pseudolikelihood −1	00911 −1	00876 −1342 −9953
Wald chi-square 927.85 931.04 3,473.8 750.7
(d.f.) (27) (27) (27) (27)
Note. Robust standard errors shown in parentheses.
p∗ < 005; p∗∗ < 001; p∗∗∗ < 0001.
products exit the market, 16.5% (14.1% excluding ﬁrm
exits by mergers and acquisitions of the time the ﬁrm
also exits, whereas for de alio ﬁrms, the corresponding
number is 5.3% (5.0%). Interestingly enough, the aver-
age dying de novo ﬁrm has 2.00 (2.12) products on the
market at the time of its exit, while the average dying
de alio offers only 1.77 (1.74).
Discussion
At the outset, we proposed that product demography
may be a mechanism that translates initial differences in
resource endowments and previous experiences between
de novo and de alio ﬁrms into survival and performance
outcomes. Two ﬁndings lend support to this idea. First,
we ﬁnd a tighter association between product exit and
ﬁrm exit for de novo than for de alio ﬁrms. Second, we
also ﬁnd that de novo ﬁrms’ products exit the market at
a signiﬁcantly higher rate than de alio ﬁrms’.
Why do products of de novo ﬁrms experience shorter
market longevity than those of de alio ﬁrms? We the-
orized that differences in resources, capabilities, and
identities combine in their impact on product market
longevity. For example, we argued that higher exit rates
of de novo ﬁrms’ products may result from identity
pressures to turnaround products quickly in an attempt
to keep up with the shifting technological frontier.
Supporting this idea, we found that de novo ﬁrms tend to
offer products closer to the technological frontier and to
compete mostly in the range of technologically advanced
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products, whereas de alio ﬁrms compete over a wider
range of product performance distribution. Yet, identity
is only part of the story.
Identity-based pressures likely operate on ﬁrms in
the launching of new products. While all ﬁrms need to
attract investors, employees, suppliers, and customers,
de alio ﬁrms come to the market initially with histo-
ries, reputations, and resources; de novo ﬁrms do not.
Accordingly, de novo ﬁrms need to demonstrate more
clearly early on (perhaps before actual entry) that they
can compete effectively. When competition takes a tech-
nological character, de novo ﬁrms should therefore face
more rigorous screening on the basis of the technical
qualities in the initial start-up phase, and should exhibit
more advanced technical properties at entry. Moreover,
once established, this difference should persist. A ﬁrm
founded as a technological leader remains under pres-
sure to maintain a position in that realm: It is bench-
marked against its previous products and its now-public
identity facilitates its renewal. Failure to meet these
expectations likely results in difﬁculty in promoting new
products to customers.
Identity pressures alone cannot, however, explain
how de novo ﬁrms manage to introduce technologi-
cally advanced products. Introduction of such products
demands capabilities designed for product innovation
(Sørensen and Stuart 2000). De novo ﬁrms are more
likely to develop such capabilities than de alio ﬁrms
for two reasons. First, because imprinting of de novo
ﬁrms happens in the focal industry (Stinchcombe 1965),
their capabilities are likely to closely reﬂect technologi-
cal demands of this industry. Second, because at the time
of entry into a focal industry, de alio ﬁrms transfer rou-
tines and structures from their parent companies, they
tend to be more architecturally complex than de novo
ﬁrms and, consequently, more inertial in their abilities
to change (Hannan et al. 2003a, b). Thus, de novo ﬁrms
not only develop capabilities better attuned to the focal
technological environment, but are also more capable of
changing them if the environment shifts. As a result,
they are more capable of continuously offering techno-
logically advanced products (Khessina 2003). By con-
trast, de alio ﬁrms have better developed manufacturing,
marketing, and distribution capabilities that help them
offer products that are more likely to succeed, and, as a
result, to have a longer market life. Thus, both forces of
identity pressures and capabilities are needed to explain
greater market exit rates of de novo ﬁrms’ products.
The analyses reveal additional support for the ideas
that identity pressures and organizational capabilities
play a large role in product market longevity. For exam-
ple, Model 3.1 shows that products offered by public
ﬁrms have the shorter market life than those offered by
private ﬁrms. This ﬁnding can be interpreted as offering
extra support to the identity pressures idea. Public com-
panies are generally under greater social scrutiny than
private ﬁrms and may be expected to behave in certain
ways in speciﬁc industries by shareholders with partic-
ular interests in those industries. For instance, share-
holders may pressure public companies to offer prod-
ucts at the technological frontier, and as a result, to
quickly turnaround products in their existing portfo-
lios. Some extra support for the capability idea can
also be seen in Model 3.1. It shows the greater mar-
ket longevity of products made by ﬁrms with a larger
number of patents in optical technology (a type of
capability) and by Japanese ﬁrms renowned for their
research, manufacturing, and marketing capabilities in
optoelectronics.
The important role of identity pressures and orga-
nizational capabilities behind differences in product
longevity between de novo and de alio ﬁrms should
attenuate as ﬁrms age in the focal industry. Over time,
identity pressures on surviving de novo ﬁrms become
less ﬁerce as organizations develop manufacturing, mar-
keting, and distribution capabilities that allow them to
offer products with a greater likelihood of market suc-
cess. Supporting this idea, we found that the exit rate
of de novo ﬁrms’ products converge with that of de alio
ﬁrms’, as the ﬁrms grow older in the industry. This ﬁnd-
ing is consistent with studies showing that the mortality
rate of de novo ﬁrms converges over time with that of
de alio organizations (Carroll et al. 1996, Hannan et al.
1998). It thus provides additional indirect support to
the idea of product demography as a mechanism behind
entry mode effect on organizational survival.
Identity and capabilities are not the only driving
forces behind a longer market life of de alio ﬁrms’
products. We theorized that de alio ﬁrms have rea-
sons and resources to keep on the market products that
are no longer individually viable. Speciﬁcally, we sug-
gested that three internal processes can either prompt
or enable a ﬁrm to keep unviable products on the mar-
ket: slack resources, captive production, and structural
inertia. A number of controls in empirical models pro-
vide proxies for these processes. The variables measur-
ing ﬁrm revenues, size of a ﬁrm’s product portfolio, and
a ﬁrm’s number of patents can be considered a proxy
for slack resources. Captive product dummy controls
for captive production; and the variables measuring ﬁrm
public status, revenues, and cumulative number of prod-
ucts provide a proxy for ﬁrm structural inertia. Even
controlling for all these variables, de alio ﬁrms’ products
still show a signiﬁcantly lower rate of market exit. Thus
the longevity of de alio products seem to be driven less
by a ﬁrm’s intentional or unintentional decisions to keep
even unproﬁtable products on the market, but more by
actual product market success. Additionally, statistical
results reveal that the role of observable resources may
be not strong. The following variables, which are often
used to measure resources, do not signiﬁcantly affect
product longevity in fully speciﬁed models: ﬁrm size
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(measured by revenues) and ﬁrm number of products.
Not all resources, of course, are captured by these vari-
ables, but the ﬁndings, nevertheless, suggest the neces-
sity to look deeper into the issue.
Although the data are not detailed enough to adjudi-
cate among the processes of identity, capabilities, and
resources behind differences in product demography
between de novo and de alio ﬁrms, it seems that iden-
tity pressures and capabilities play a greater role than
resources. On the other hand, capabilities are often tied to
resources. It is possible that resources still play a key role
but indirectly, through the impact of capabilities. Overall,
because the evidence is indirect, further investigation is
needed before any ﬁrm conclusions can be made.
Other limitations of this study are common to single-
industry research. While having data on all products
shipped in the ODD industry from its beginning in 1983
through 1999 allowed us to avoid survivor and selec-
tion biases in the statistical analyses, there is always a
question as to what extent our ﬁndings are generalizable
to other industries. For example, we argue that focused
identity of de novo ﬁrms affects their product demog-
raphy by prompting start-ups to offer products at the
technological frontier. In the context of this study, i.e.,
the ODD industry, de novo ﬁrms’ identity has a well-
deﬁned technological character. However, de novo ﬁrms’
identity basis can be quite different in slow-paced low-
technology industries, and consequently, may not affect
product demography in the same way as in high-velocity
high-technology markets.
Capital intensity of the ODD industry may uniquely
shape ﬁrms’ product demography. Although ODD pro-
duction may not be as capital intensive as that of hard
disk drives (McKendrick et al. 2000, Noble 2000), it
still requires signiﬁcant ﬁnancial investment, compared
to many other industries (Esener 1999). Capital inten-
sity is driven by expensive intellectual property and
high licensing fees, costly R&D expenditures, and the
need for scale in production to achieve decent margins
(Saxonhouse 1996, Esener 1999, Noble 2000). Thus, it
is not surprising that the number of de novo entrants
into the industry constitutes only 27% of all entry, lower
than the average of 55% across different manufactur-
ing industries (Dunne et al. 1988). It also explains why
the only countries that experienced a sizeable number of
de novo entries were those with either established ven-
ture capital and/or governmental support. For instance,
the United States hosted 11 and Taiwan produced 9
de novo ﬁrms of a total 23 that entered the industry dur-
ing the observation period.
Given that capital intensity of the industry apparently
deters start-ups, a question relevant to this study con-
cerns whether these capital requirements might have
affected product demography. For example, the prowess
of de novo ﬁrms to offer products at the technological
frontier may result from a narrower and more rigorous
initial technical screening by capital holding audiences.
Similarly, shorter market longevity of de novo ﬁrms’
products (if treated as an indicator of lesser market
success) can be explained by the new ﬁrms’ difﬁculty
of obtaining enough capital to effectively develop and
market their products. Entry mode may shape prod-
uct demography differently in industries with either
much higher or much lower capital requirements. Fur-
ther research on other industries is needed to conﬁrm or
refute these issues.
Acknowledgments
The study described in this paper originated as part of a
research program directed by David McKendrick, under the
auspices of the Information Storage Industry Center, Univer-
sity of California, San Diego. Helpful comments from John
Freeman, Bronwyn Hall, Michael Hannan, Russell Hudson,
James Lincoln, David McKendrick, David Mowery, Trond
Petersen, Jesper Sørensen, Olav Sorenson, and three anony-
mous reviewers are greatly appreciated.
Endnotes
1As with hard disk drives, ODDs are designed for data storage
and retrieval. Optical drives rest on a very different technology,
however. Hard drives use magnetic methods of recording and
usually stay ﬁxed within a computer, whereas optical drives
are based on the laser beam method of recording and serve
as removable data storage. The distinct industries that devel-
oped around the two technologies differ both in organizational
membership and in historical timing. Management scholars
have studied the hard disk drive industry extensively (e.g.,
Christensen and Rosenbloom 1995, Lerner 1997, McKendrick
et al. 2000, King and Tucci 2002, Agarwal et al. 2004, Bar-
nett and McKendrick 2004), but ODDs have received far less
attention (but see Rosenkopf and Nerkar 2001; Khessina 2003,
2006).
2This research should not be confused with that from the tra-
dition examining entrants and incumbents (e.g., Tushman and
Anderson 1986, Henderson and Clark 1990). Although the two
distinctions are sometimes (mistakenly) conﬂated, no direct
parallels should be drawn between entrants and de novo ﬁrms,
on the one hand, and incumbents and de alio ﬁrms, on the
other hand. Incumbency status (incumbents versus entrants)
and entry mode (de alio versus de novo) differ in fundamen-
tal ways. Incumbency status indicates when a ﬁrm enters a
focal industry (i.e., before or after a technological disconti-
nuity). In contrast, entry mode indicates how a ﬁrm enters
a focal industry. In models not reported here, we controlled
for incumbency status. All results remained robust to this
speciﬁcation.
3Speciﬁcally, we did not code (1) products listed as prelimi-
nary speciﬁcation and (2) products when the announced date
of the ﬁrst customer shipment came after the date of the last
customer shipment.
4We cannot model ﬁrm tenure as an independent covariate by
means of time pieces in the piecewise exponential models,
because we use time pieces to model product age.
5Technically, market attractiveness of an ODD is deﬁned not
only by its time performance, but also by its recording capac-
ity. Historically, however, time performance parameters have
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turned out to be much more decisive than recording capacity
in deﬁning the attractiveness of ODDs to users, and in shaping
their chances to compete with other types of drives, e.g., hard
drives (Disk/Trend, Inc. 1999, Merrill Lynch, Co., McKinsey
and Company 2001).
6In additional analysis not reported in detail here, we also esti-
mated (at the request of a reviewer) models with controls for
overall ﬁrm tenure, and with a tenure-weighted de alio vari-
able. These estimates agree with and conﬁrm the conclusions
adopted here; namely, that the tenure-weighted de novo effect
is distinct from any overall effect of ﬁrm tenure and that its
effect is bigger than that of the tenure-weighted de alio vari-
able, especially in early product years (the effects converge
over time).
7Of these exits, a total of 7 resulted from mergers or acquisi-
tions; only 11 products (1.1% of all product exits) were asso-
ciated with mergers or acquisitions.
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